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UNITED STATES v. EIDSON: "NAVIGATING" THE WAY
TOWARD STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1970's, federal prosecutors handled only
twenty-five cases involving environmental crimes.1 During the same
decade, however, environmental concerns gained increasing recog-
nition in the political arena.2 As a result, Congress amended the
Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972.3 These amendments led to a rise
in the enforcement of pollution regulations and provided a wide
array of possible penalties.4 Consequently, the number of federal
environmental criminal indictments in 1992 reached 191.5 These
prosecutions resulted in a total of thirty-four years of prison time
and $163 million in fines. 6
In United States v. Eidson, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit faced defendants convicted of violating the
CWA after dumping hazardous wastes into a city's storm drainage
system. 7 In affirming the convictions under the CWA, the Eleventh
1. See Lindsay A. Larson III & Jean Paul Picou Overton, Representing Corporate
and Individual Clients in Criminal Prosecution for Environmental Pollution: A Primer, 19
TUL. MAR. L.J. 113, 132 (1994) (citing Michael A. Verespej, The Newest Evironmental
Risk: Jail, INDUSTRY WK-, Jan. 22, 1990, at 47, 48).
2. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 3-7 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3670-74. Congress was concerned specifically with the health of United States citi-
zens and the safety of fish, shellfish and wildlife. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674; see also Paul G. Nittoly, Environ-
mental Criminal Cases: The Dawn of a New Era, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 1125 (1991)
(noting increasing publicity surrounding waste disposal crisis).
3. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)) [hereinafter CWA]. The CWA was
originally enacted under the name Federal Water Pollution Act.
4. See id. For relevant provisions of the CWA, see infra notes 33-37 and accom-
panying text.
5. See Larson & Overton, supra note 1, at 132 (citing Rick Henderson, Crimes
Against Nature: The New Vice Crusaders Turning Justice Upside Down, REASON, Dec.
1993, at 19).
6. See Larson & Overton, supra note 1, at 132.
7. 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 248 (1997). For a detailed
discussion of the facts of United States v. Eidson, see infra notes 15-32 and accompa-
nying text.
The United States' criminal justice system was not unfamiliar to Charles and
Sandra Eidson. Charles Eidson was head of the controversial Church of the
Avenger, a group known for promoting white-supremacist and anti-Semitic beliefs
in the southern portion of the United States. See Bentley Orrick, Digging up Dirt
Smudges a Town's Life, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 10, 1995, available in 1995 WL 13839554.
(605)
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Circuit held that the drainage ditch in question constituted "naviga-
ble waters" of the United States.8 By broadening the term "naviga-
ble waters," the Eleventh Circuit followed the current trend of strict
Charles Eidson has stated on several occasions that he has successful methods of
fighting the government, and has been known to display a large swastika in the
storefront window of the church. See id.
A few months after the Eidsons were evicted from the commercial property
they had used for the Church of the Avenger, Eidson's Church was linked to
Greater Ministries International, the subject of a significant investment scam inves-
tigation. See Doug Stanley, Controversial Groups Linked by Court File, TAMPA TRIB.,
Jan. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7029317. Eidson denied any meaningful con-
nection between the two groups. See id. Sources stated that he was attempting to
keep a low profile after his eviction from the church's headquarters two years ear-
lier. See id. During that eviction, witnesses observed members of the church leav-
ing the property with portraits of Adolf Hitler, several weapons and signs reading
"damnable Jews." See id.
Recently, Charles Eidson publicly renounced his anti-Semitic beliefs, stating
that "[if] a wall-kissingJew came in here today, I'd hug his neck." Michael Fechter,
State Foiled in Bid to Regulate Ministry Money, TAMPA TIB., Feb. 15, 1997, available in
1997 WL 7035216. He continued by announcing his recent efforts to "unite Chris-
tians of all faiths." Id. One commentator pointed out that while the Church of the
Avenger seems inactive, it has been connected to several "right-wing militia move-
ments." Id. The church's publications warn of "excessive government intrusion
and the harassment of Christians." Id.
In April 1997, Eidson, with the leader of Greater Ministries, commenced suit
against several newspapers. See Suit Filed Against Tribune, TAMPA TPUB., Apr. 29,
1997, available in 1997 WL 10784389. The complaint alleged that the newspapers
were "leading a conspiracy against Christianity," and asked for $10 billion and an
injunction against "further campaigns of terror." Id. A federal judge dismissed the
suit in October 1997. See In Brief News of Tampa Bay, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 5, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13836146.
Eidson was also among seven individuals named as unindicted co-conspirators
in a local militia movement. See Michael Fechter, Charity Group Linked to Militia
Organization, TAMPA TPIB., May 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10785662. The move-
ment acted under the "authority" of its own "Constitutional Common Law Court"
when it declared war on the United States and threatened several judicial officials.
See id.
Most recently, a Florida court enjoined Eidson from representing others in
court and from filing any legal documents on their behalf. See In Brief News of
Tampa Bay, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13841468. The injunc-
tion came after Eidson attempted to represent a woman in court for traffic viola-
tions. See id. His representation resulted in suspension of the woman's license and
points against her concerning her driving record. See id. The court subsequently
ordered Eidson to pay $2,406 in legal costs. See id.
Charles and Sandra's son, Keith Norland Eidson, has had legal problems of
his own and was convicted of violating the CWA in 1994. See United States v. Hart-
sell, 127 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 1997). Keith Eidson operated a wastewater treat-
ment and disposal business named Cherokee Resources, Inc. See id. at 346.
Because the company accepted more waste than it could handle, Eidson frequently
ordered illegal dumping. See id. at 347. Employees were instructed to dump waste-
water into a toilet at the company's facility, and sometimes discharged pollutants
directly into the sewer system. See id. Keith Eidson was sentenced to 51 months in
prison for "conspiracy to knowingly violate the CWA, knowingly violating pretreat-
ment standards, and tampering with a pollutant monitoring device." Id.
8. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340 (holding that "drainage ditch connecting In-
graham and Commerce Streets is a 'navigable water' under the CWA").
[Vol. IX: p. 605
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enforcement of environmental law and left the door open for fu-
ture courts to broaden the scope of the CWA even further.9
Part II of this Note provides a detailed examination of Eidson,
discussing the case's factual background, as well as its procedural
history.'0 Part III considers the text of the CWA, relevant legislative
history and judicial interpretations of the statute."' Part IV analyzes
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Eidson,'2 while Part V considers
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning as compared to prior case law and
legislative intent.13 Finally, Part VI discusses the significance of the
Eidson holding and its potential impact on the future of environ-
mental criminal litigation.14
II. FAcrs
Cherokee Trading Partners, Inc. (Cherokee) was a used oil re-
cycling and wastewater disposal business.1 5 For little or no fee,
Cherokee collected used oil from local businesses, transported the
oil to Cherokee's facilities, reduced its water content, if necessary,
and resold the product to other businesses. 16 For a higher fee,
Cherokee would also agree to properly dispose of industrial waste-
water.1 7 Charles Eidson and his wife, Sandra, managed the corpo-
ration, which had its principle place of business in Tampa,
Florida.'8
9. For a discussion of the trend toward heightened enforcement of environ-
mental laws, see infra notes 33-58, 65-87 and accompanying text. For an analysis of
the implications of the Eidson holding, see infra notes 150-58 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Eidson, see infra
notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the text of the CWA, its legislative history and case law
concerning the CWA, see infra notes 33-87 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Eidson, see infra
notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
13. For a comparison of the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning with the analyses of
other courts and with the legislature's intent, see infra notes 110-49 and accompa-
nying text.
14. For a discussion of the impact of the holding in Eidson, see infra notes 150-
58 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1340 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 248 (1997).
16. See id. The principle business of Cherokee Trading Partners, Inc. (Chero-
kee) was collecting used oil and selling it to companies in the fertilizer industry.
See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1339-40. Charles Eidson was the president of Cherokee, while
Sandra acted as its secretary and registered agent. See id.
1998] EIDSON
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In April of 1990, a Tampa police officer noticed a Cherokee
truck parked at an intersection close to the company's facility. 19
The driver of the truck was pumping a "sludge substance" from the
truck into a sewer that emptied into a storm drainage ditch. 20 The
ditch led to a nearby drainage canal that eventually emptied into
Tampa Bay.21 A light flow of water was running through the storm
drainage ditch at the time of this occurrence. 22
As the officer observed the drainage, Sandra Eidson arrived to
speak with him. 23 She informed the officer, and later an environ-
mental official, that the substance had been used to rinse an under-
ground fuel tank and that she had instructed the driver to dispose
of it in the sewer. 24 Upon further investigation, authorities learned
19. See id. at 1340. Officer David Broce observed a white oil tanker on the
corner of Ingraham and O'Brien Streets, about 100 yards from Cherokee's prop-
erty. See id. The truck was empty, but had lines running into a nearby ditch. See
Brief for Appellee, at 7, United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-2330); Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d
1336 (11th Cir. 1997)(No. 94-2330).
20. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. Officer Broce testified that the operator of
the tanker was pumping the substance into the underground ditch, which con-
nected Ingraham and O'Brien Streets. See id. He approached the truck and asked
the operator to stop the pumping process. See Appellee's Brief at 7, Eidson (No. 94-
2330); Appellant's Brief at 3, Eidson (No. 94-2330). The operator agreed and Of-
ficer Broce contacted the local Environmental Protection Commission (Commis-
sion). See Appellee's Brief at 7, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 3, Eidson
(No. 94-2330). Gerald Tousley, a representative from the Commission, arrived
soon after to assist Officer Broce. See Appellee's Brief at 7, Eidson (No. 94-2330);
Appellant's Brief at 3, Eidson (No. 94-2330). He took samples of the substance
being pumped from the tanker that later tested positive for compounds normally
associated with petroleum, namely, benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene and xylene.
See Appellee's Brief at 8-9, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 3-5, Eidson
(No. 94-2330).
21. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. At trial, testimony revealed that the drainage
ditch under Ingraham Street led to a canal that flowed to Picnic Island Creek, a
tributary of Tampa Bay. See Appellee's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's
Brief at 5, Eidson (No. 94-2330). The flow from this ditch varied with the tide and
the weather. See Appellee's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 5,
Eidson (No. 94-2330). At certain times of year, the ditch was completely dry; how-
ever, fish were observed swimming in the ditch at times when it did contain water.
See Appellee's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 5, Eidson (No.
94-2330). Designers created the system to discharge storm water into Tampa Bay.
See Appellee's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6, Eidson (No.
94-2330).
22. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. The flow continued throughout the system
until it reached Tampa Bay, where the drainage canal ended. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. Sandra Eidson also informed the officer that she was the vice-presi-
dent of Cherokee and that the company had permission to dispose of the liquid in
the sewer. See id. At this point, Gerald Tousley went to the Cherokee offices,
where he questioned Charles Eidson. See Appellee's Brief at 8, Eidson (No. 94-
2330); Appellant's Brief at 3, Eidson (No. 94-2330). Charles Eidson stated that he
had asked Sandra to instruct the employee to pump waste materials into the sewer.
4
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that Charles and Sandra Eidson frequently instructed employees to
conduct the unauthorized dumping of industrial wastewater. 25 Au-
thorities also discovered that the company put significant effort into
concealing this practice from government officials. 26 While Chero-
kee was disposing of wastewater in this manner, it continually as-
See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. On behalf of the Commission, Tousley issued a warn-
ing notice to Cherokee as a result of the incident. See Appellee's Brief at 3, Eidson
(No. 94-2330).
25. SeeEidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. In August, 1990, the Commission conducted
an announced inspection of Cherokee facilities. See Appellee's Brief at 15, Eidson
(No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 3-4, Eidson (No. 94-2330). Tousley gave a tour
of the facilities, noting evidence of oily dirt on the property and in bags thrown in
a dumpster. See Appellee's Brief at 15, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 4,
Eidson (No. 94-2330). He also discovered ponding oil inside a Cherokee contain-
ment facility. See Appellee's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 5,
Eidson (No. 94-2330).
In November, 1990, Cherokee applied for a permit as a use-all collection facil-
ity. See Appellee's Brief at 15, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 7, Eidson
(No. 94-2330). As a result, an official from the Florida Department of Environ-
mental Regulation took several samples from the site's well, its containment area,
the area surrounding a tank, the adjacent property and a site near the company's
trailer. See Appellee's Brief at 15, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 7, Eid-
son (No. 94-2330). Except for the well-water, all of the samples tested positive for
hydrocarbons. See Appellee's Brief at 15-16, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's
Brief at 7-8, Eidson (No. 94-2330).
Employees regularly dumped wastewater into the ground on Cherokee's prop-
erty, or into the woods of an adjacent lot. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. One Cher-
okee employee testified that Charles Eidson instructed co-workers to dump waste
from the bottom of oil tanks onto the ground. See Appellee's Brief at 9-10, Eidson
(No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Eidson (No. 94-2330). Another employee
offered similar testimony. See Appellee's Brief at 9-10, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appel-
lant's Brief at 6-7, Eidson (No. 94-2330). This employee stated that both Charles
and Sandra Eidson instructed him to drain "murky" water from oil tanks to adja-
cent property. See Appellee's Brief at 9-10, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief
at 6-7, Eidson (No. 94-2330). If the ground was too wet, he was instructed to leave
the tank overnight and try to drain the water the next morning. See Appellee's
Brief at 9-10, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Eidson (No. 94-2330).
During the five months that he worked for Cherokee, this employee was never
instructed to transport waste off site for treatment. See Appellee's Brief at 9-10,
Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Eidson (No. 94-2330).
26. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. Prior to an environmental inspection,
Charles Eidson would instruct employees to spread truckloads of dirt over the
property. See Appellee's Brief at 15, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6,
Eidson (No. 94-2330). He also arranged for oil drums to be loaded onto a rental
truck and driven off site until inspections were complete. See Appellee's Brief at
15, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6, Eidson (No. 94-2330). Cherokee's
business records indicated that wastewater had been dumped into "Tank 8." See
Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. At trial, three different employees testified that Tank 8
did not exist. See Appellee's Brief at 14, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at
6-7, Eidson (No. 94-2330). When Charles and Sandra Eidson directed employees to
dump waste into Tank 8, this meant that the substance was to be disposed of on
the ground. See Appellee's Brief at 14, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 6-
7, Eidson (No. 94-2330).
EIDSON 6091998]
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sured its customers that the company complied with all applicable
laws, regulations and permits. 27
Both Charles and Sandra Eidson were indicted and charged
with violating the CWA by knowingly discharging or causing the dis-
charge of pollutants into navigable waters of the United States.28
Additionally, these environmental infringements led to charges of
mail fraud, since the Eidsons used false representations to solicit
customers for their business.29 In the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, ajury convicted the couple on all
charges, and Charles and Sandra Eidson were sentenced to serve
seventy and thirty-seven months imprisonment, respectively.30
The Eidsons appealed, arguing that the storm drain did not
constitute "navigable water" under the CWA.31 After reviewing the
case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the drainage ditch was in
27. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. One customer testified that an individual at
Cherokee indicated, over the phone, that the company had all necessary licenses
to dispose of his business' wastewater. See Appellee's Brief at 13, Eidson (No. 94-
2330); Appellant's Brief at 8, Eidson (No. 94-2330). Another received documents
from the company which led him to believe that Cherokee had the essential per-
mits for handling wastewater. See Appellee's Brief at 12-14, Eidson (No. 94-2330);
Appellant's Brief at 8, Eidson (No. 94-2330). Similarly, an official from Mobil Oil
Corporation contracted with Cherokee to remove wastewater from a service sta-
tion. See Appellee's Brief at 13, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 9, Eidson
(No. 94-2330). The contract that the official from Mobil Oil Corporation signed
contained provisions that the water would be disposed of in compliance with cur-
rent laws, codes and regulations. See Appellee's Brief at 13, Eidson (No. 94-2330);
Appellant's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-2330). A customer who dealt directly with
Charles and Sandra Eidson received a letter indicating that waste was disposed of
properly. See Appellee's Brief at 14, Eidson (No. 94-2330); Appellant's Brief at 9,
Eidson (No. 94-2330). In reality, Cherokee lacked the necessary permits for the
handling and disposal of wastewater. See Appellee's Brief at 9, Eidson (No. 94-
2330); Appellant's Brief at 10, Eidson (No. 94-2330).
28. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340.
29. See id. On appeal, the defendants argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to uphold mail fraud convictions. See id. at 1343. Mail fraud occurs when
one "intentionally participate[s] in a scheme to defraud or to obtain money by
fraudulent pretenses and representations," and "use [s] the United States mails to
further that scheme." Id. (citing United States v. Wingate, 997 F.2d 1429, 1433
(11th Cir. 1993)). In their contracts and advertisements, the defendants assured
clients that they were handling wastewater "in accordance with all applicable laws,
codes, and regulations." Id. Based upon these misrepresentations, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the defendants' convictions of mail fraud. See id. at 1343-44.
30. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340.
31. See id. at 1341. The defendants also alleged that there was insufficient
evidence to support their mail fraud convictions, and that certain upward sentenc-
ing adjustments made by the district court were unwarranted. See id. at 1344. In
addition, they argued that the CWA was unconstitutionally vague in its definition
of "pollutants." See id. at 1343. The defendants asked the Eleventh Circuit to re-
verse and remand with instructions to reverse the convictions on all counts in the
indictments. See Appellant's Brief at 32, Eidson (No. 94-2330).
[Vol. IX: p. 605
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EIDSON
fact a "navigable water" under the CWA and affirmed the
convictions. 32
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act
By enacting the CWA, Congress intended "to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."3 3 The CWA makes it a crime for "any person" to discharge
"any pollutant" without a designated permit.3 4 It also provides for
32. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340. The Eleventh Circuit also upheld the mail
fraud convictions and several of the upward sentencing adjustments. See id. It did
rule, however, that two of the district court's adjustments were not warranted. See
id. at 1346-47. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentences and re-
manded the case to the district court. See id. at 1347.
33. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). In protecting the waters of
the United States, Congress's main concern was public health and safety. S. REP.
No. 92-414, at 3-4 (1972). The Senate's Public Works Committee had become
"increasingly concerned... with the effects of pollution upon public health" and it
stated that "It] he legislation reported by the Committee [was] the result of deep
concern for protection of the health of the American people." Id.; see also S. REp.
No. 99-50, at 29 (1985) (noting that environmental carelessness can lead to "seri-
ous environmental harm and millions of dollars of damage to... property," as well
as "the clear potential for loss of life and serious personal injury"); H.R. REp. No.
99-189, 31 (1985) (stating that environmental violations can "result in significant
harm to public health or the environment").
The concern for the protection of health was also evident in a 1985 debate
involving the CWA. See 131 CONG. REc. S7993 (daily ed. June 12, 1985) (statement
of Sen. Chafee). During the debate, Senator Chafee noted that the CWA is of
great importance to the United States. See id. Agreeing with Senator Chafee, Sena-
tor Moynahan discussed the public health issues related to the CWA. See id. In
doing so, he stated:
[T] he discovery of waterborne disease and the transfer of disease-causing
organisms from sewage systems to drinking water supplies [was a] great
[event] . . . in public health in the 19th century. It was with [this ad-
vance] that cholera and such diseases and gastrointestinal diseases were
first understood and began to be suppressed and the life of man
changed. One only has to live in a society where water is not clean to
understand the dimension of the issue involved. So it is altogether appro-
priate that one of the first major measures which the Congress enacted
... was for clean water, both as a traditional measure of managing waste
of various kinds, and, also, looking to the newer questions.. . as we dis-
covered the consequences of runoffs of chemicals that come from agri-
cultural . .. and industrial uses.
Id. at S7995 (statement of Sen. Moynahan).
34. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). "Except as in compliance with this
section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." Id. Permits are available
only in limited circumstances and the Administrator of EPA has broad discretion
over their issuance and revocation. See id. § 302(b) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b) (2).
Specifically, section 302(b) (2) of the CWA provides:
The Administrator, with the concurrence of the State, may issue a permit
which modifies the effluent limitations required by subsection (a) of this
section for pollutants other than toxic pollutants if the applicant demon-
1998]
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the enforcement of its provisions through fines, imprisonment, or
both.3 5 Under section 309(c) of the CWA, a person may face a
strates at such hearing that (whether or not technology or other alterna-
tive sources are available) there is no reasonable relationship between the
economic and social costs and the benefits to be obtained (including at-
tainment of the objective of this chapter) from achieving such limitation.
Id. Additionally, section 318 of the CWA provides:
(a) The Administrator is authorized, after public hearings, to permit the
discharge of a specific pollutant or pollutants under controlled condi-
tions associated with an approved aquaculture project under Federal or
State supervision pursuant to section 1342 of this title.
(b) The Administrator shall by regulation establish any procedures and
guidelines which the Administrator deems necessary to carry out this sec-
tion. Such regulations shall require the application to such discharge of
each criterion, factor, procedure, and requirement applicable to a permit
issued under section 1342 of this title, as the Administrator determines
necessary to carry out the objective of this chapter.
(c) Each State desiring to administer its own permit program within its
jurisdiction for discharge of a specific pollutant or pollutants under con-
trolled conditions associated with an approved aquaculture project may
do so if upon submission of such program the Administrator determines
such program is adequate to carry out the objective of this chapter.
Id. § 318, 33 U.S.C. § 1328; see also CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (setting forth
extensive and highly detailed procedures for issuance of permits to discharge cer-
tain pollutants).
35. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. The enforcement provision of the CWA
states:
Any person who-
(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1321 (b) (3), 1328, or 1345 of this tide, or any permit condition or
limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued
under section 1342 of this tide by the Administrator or by a State, or
any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved
under section 1342(a) (3) or 1342(b) (8) of this title or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this tide by the Secretary of the Army or
by a State; or
(B) knowingly introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which
such person knew or reasonably should have known could cause per-
sonal injury or property damage or, other than in compliance with
all applicable Federal, State, or local requirements or permits, which
causes such treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or con-
dition in a permit issued to the treatment works under section 1342
of this tide by the Administrator or a State;
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by
both.
Id. § 309(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2).
Section 309(c) (1) sets forth provisions for negligent violations of the CWA.
See id. § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). It states:
Any person who-
(A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1321 (b) (3), 1328, or 1345 of this tide, or any permit condition or
limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued
under section 1342 of this tide by the Administrator or by a State, or
any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved
8
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maximum $50,000 fine, as well as three years imprisonment, by
knowingly discharging or causing the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters of the United States.36 Responsible corporate of-
ficers constitute "persons" for purposes of the CWA.3 7
While Congress clearly intended to criminalize the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters of the United States, it failed to
provide a clear definition of the term "navigable waters."38 The
CWA merely states that "navigable waters" are "waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas."39 The legislative history, how-
under section 1342(a) (3) or 1342(b) (8) of this title or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary of the Army or
by a State; or
(B) negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which
such person knew or reasonably should have known could cause per-
sonal injury or property damage or, other than in compliance with
all applicable Federal, State, or local requirements or permits, which
causes such treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or con-
dition in any permit issued to the treatment works under section
1342 of this title by the Administrator or a State;
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by
both.
Id. Similarly, a person who knowingly violates the CWA, "and who knows at the
time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or seri-
ous bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than
$250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both." Id.
§ 309(c) (3) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (3) (A).
36. See id. § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). For the text of section 309(c) (2)
of the CWA, see supra note 35 and accompanying text. If a person violates this
provision a second time, the penalty potentially doubles. See id. (stating that "[i]f a
conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such
person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than
$100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by
both"). A decreased penalty exists for negligent violations of the CWA, while it
increases for knowing endangerment to another person. See id. § 309(c)(1) &
(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) & (3)(A).
37. See id. § 309(c) (6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (6) (stating that "[flor the purpose
of this subsection, the term 'person' means.., any responsible corporate officer").
There has been much discussion concerning this aspect of the CWA. See generally
Truxtun Hare, Comment, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Corporate Of-
ficers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 935 (1990).
One commentator noted that today's environmental statutes subject "corporate
officials to strict liability for actions or omissions in which they had a legally de-
fined 'responsible share' yet no direct participation or knowledge." Id. at 935. As
such, these statutes hold corporate officers liable by reason of status and responsi-
bility, regardless of their awareness or knowledge of the environmental violation.
See id. at 936.
38. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132
(1985) (noting that CWA itself is ambiguous in its definition of "navigable
waters").
39. CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
1998] EIDSON 613
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ever, provides evidence as to which waters Congress intended to
protect with the CWA.40
The CWA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the definition of navigable waters to be broad.41 The legis-
lative history indicates that Congress intended for the CWA to
extend to "the navigable waters of the United States, portions
thereof, tributaries thereof, and includes the territorial seas and the
Great Lakes. '42 The legislative history reflects that Congress recog-
nized that water moves in cycles, and therefore, believed that pollu-
tion must be controlled at its source, rather than after it has
contaminated various bodies of water along its path. 43
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has provided
its own expansive interpretation of "waters of the United States."44
According to EPA regulations, the term includes areas such as
mudflats, swamps and small ponds.45 Many federal courts have
40. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3742-43; see also United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 1317,
1325 (6th Cir. 1974) (examining Congress's expanded definition of "navigable wa-
ters" and considering intent behind definition). For a discussion of the CWA's
legislative history, see infra notes 41-43, 113-21 and accompanying text.
41. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3742-43. A Senate Report states that " [ t] he control strategy of the Act extends to
navigable waters of the United States, portions thereof, tributaries thereof, and
includes the territorial seas and Great Lakes. Through a narrow interpretation of
the definition of interstate waters the implementation [of an earlier statute] was
severely limited." Id. at 3742.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 3742-43. In the legislative history, Congress indicated that
"[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants
be controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to the control requirements
must be made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries." Id.
44. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1997). For EPA's definition of "waters of the United
States," see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
45. See id. In its entirety, EPA's definition of "waters of the United States"
includes:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all wa-
ters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degrada-
tion or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by in-
dustries in interstate commerce;
10
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adopted EPA's broad approach to defining "waters of the United
States.
46
B. Judicial Definitions of "Navigable Waters"
In interpreting the scope of the CWA, courts have paid special
attention to the legislative intent behind the statute.47 This close
examination of the legislative history has resulted in a broad defini-
tion of "navigable waters" for many jurisdictions.48 The United
States Supreme Court first addressed the issue in United States v.
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under this definition.
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (1) through (4) of this
section;
(6) The territorial sea;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this section; waste
treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to
meet the requirements of CWA ... are not waters of the United States.
Waters of the United States do not include prior converted cropland.
Id.
46. For a discussion of the decisions in which courts have adopted EPA's defi-
nition of "waters of the United States," see infra notes 47-87 and accompanying
text.
47. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate for courts
to examine the legislative history in interpreting the law. See New Jersey v. New
York, No. 120, 1997 WL 291594, at *24 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1997) (stating Supreme
Court often looks to legislative history when considering statutes' meanings);
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 238 (1990) (holding courts must inter-
pret unclear statutes in accord with policies and goals of Congress); Coronado-
Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that courts must first
look to plain language of statutes, then to legislative history); Kincade v. Spark-
man, 117 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating statutes must be construed in har-
mony with legislative intent).
The Supreme Court has relied on legislative history in deciding cases involv-
ing the CWA. See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121 (1985). In Riverside, the Court stated that it was appropriate to look to the
legislative history and policies behind the CWA when considering its terms. Id. at
132. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit placed significant weight on the legislative intent
behind the CWA. See generally Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir.
1985). In upholding EPA regulations against a mining company dumping waste
into a small creek, the Tenth Circuit relied on Congress's stated goal of protecting
all waters from pollution. See id. at 129. In an earlier case, the Sixth Circuit based
its interpretation of the CWA on the congressional intent that the statute "be given
the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency de-
terminations which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes."
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 1317, 1324 (6th Cir.
1974) (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 33,756-57 (1972)).
48. The Supreme Court relied heavily on legislative intent in Riverside. 474
U.S. at 121. The Court noted that Congress recognized that the problem of water
pollution required broad federal authority. See id. at 132-33. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that "Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly," and
'evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation
by earlier water pollution control statutes .... " Id. at 133.
19981
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Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.49 In Riverside, the Court held that wet-
lands adjacent to, but not regularly flooded by rivers, streams and
other areas traditionally identified as "waters" constituted "naviga-
ble waters" under the CWA.50 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court placed significant emphasis on both the intention of Con-
gress and the scientific classifications of EPA.51
This view of the CWA's legislative intent similarly was expressed by the court
in Georgia v. City ofEast Ridgewhen it stated that "[a] Ithough Congress included the
term 'navigable' in the statute, Congress intended to broadly define the waters that
would fall within the legislation's protection." 949 F. Supp. 1571, 1577 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-33). In East Ridge, citizens and the govern-
ment of Georgia brought an action against a city in neighboring Tennessee. See id.
at 1573. The claim alleged that city employees had violated the CWA by discharg-
ing raw sewage into a manhole that overflowed into a storm drain leading to an
unnamed tributary. See id. at 1574. During heavy rains, residents observed "waste-
water containing raw sewage, feces, toilet paper, tampons, and other materials"
overflow from the manhole and into the storm drain. Id. The court relied on the
legislative history of the CWA to construe the term "navigable waters" broadly and
apply it to the unnamed tributary. See id. at 1577-88.
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona in United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp. followed the reasoning of East Ridge. 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1184-87
(D. Ariz. 1975). In its opinion, the court in Phelps Dodge engaged in a lengthy
discussion of the CWA's legislative intent. See id. As a result, the court held that
even "normally dry arroyos, where any water which might flow therein could rea-
sonably end up in any body of water" constituted navigable waters of the United
States. Id. at 1187.
After careful consideration of the history behind environmental legislation,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in United States v.
Holland concluded that non-navigable man-made mosquito canals constituted
"navigable waters." 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974). In Holland, officials
attempted to enjoin several individuals from filling man-made mosquito canals
with sand, dirt, dredged soil and biological materials. See id. at 667. The court
concluded that Congress intended "that the term 'navigable waters' be given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation ...." Id. at 672 (quoting S. REP.
No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3822).
49. 474 U.S. 121 (1984).
50. See id. at 139. In Riverside, the Army Corps of Engineers sought to enjoin a
local landowner from filling wetlands without a permit. See id. at 124. The prop-
erty contained vegetation requiring saturated soil for survival. See id. at 130-31. It
was adjacent to a navigable lake, but was not frequently flooded or permeated by
the lake. See id. at 134.
51. See id. at 131-39. The Army Corps of Engineers developed its definition of
navigable waters in accordance with that of EPA. See id. at 133. The Corps in-
cluded adjacent wetlands in its definition, noting that wetlands affect the quality of
adjacent waters even when not actually flooded by them. See id. at 134. For exam-
ple, wetlands may drain into adjacent waters and also may serve as nesting and
spawning sites for many biological species. See id. at 134-35. Thus, the Corps rea-
soned that even though adjacent waters may not be the source of a wetland's mois-
ture, the wetland is an integral part of the aquatic environment and must be
protected. See id. at 135. The Court stated that EPA and the Army Corps of Engi-
neers were reasonable in interpreting the CWA broadly, in light of "the evident
breadth of congressional concern for protection of water quality and aquatic eco-
systems . . . ." Id. at 133.
12
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Following the Supreme Court's decision in Riverside, federal
courts were not hesitant in expanding the term "navigable waters"
beyond its literal meaning. 52 Courts deemed wetlands adjacent to
bodies of water and unnamed tributaries leading to interstate
creeks "navigable waters" under the CWA.53 In fact, one court, rec-
ognizing that many courts were reading the CWA broadly, com-
mented that "courts applying the Act have effectively ignored the
term 'navigable.' -54
52. See, e.g., United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988). In United
States v. Larkins, the Sixth Circuit examined alleged violations of the CWA by two
brothers. See id. The defendants had acquired a large parcel of land in the flood
plain of Obion Creek, a tributary of the Mississippi River. See id. at 190. When
purchased, several acres of the land were knee-deep in water. See id. The defend-
ants began digging ditches, cutting timber, blasting beaver dams and filling low
spots. See id. A few years later, they began construction of dikes and levees on the
property. See id. After an aerial inspection in 1982, officials notified the defend-
ants that they had been discharging materials into portions of land classified as
"wetlands." See id. Nevertheless, the brothers continued their work, completing
the construction of dikes and levees. See id.
The government brought an action against the brothers, alleging that their
construction efforts were in violation of the CWA. See id. The District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky agreed, concluding that the land in dispute con-
stituted wetlands and was covered by the CWA. See id. at 191. On appeal, the
defendants argued that the property could not be defined as wetlands without
officials first examining the frequency of the soil's saturation. See id. at 192. The
Sixth Circuit disagreed, however, and stated that it was not necessary for land to be
saturated frequently to constitute "wetlands." See id. Rather, the Sixth Circuit
noted that "[t] he presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for
growth and reproduction on land adjacent to a body of navigable water is suffi-
cient to bring the land under the... definition of 'wetlands.'" Id. (citing Riverside,
474 U.S. at 130-31). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's order that the
defendants restore the wetlands they had polluted and fined them $40,000. See id.
at 190.
In United States v. Schallom, the Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction under the
CWA where the defendant discharged "shotcrete," a mixture of sand, cement and
water into a small creek. 998 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1993)(per curiam). The
defendant was site superintendent for a company hired to repair a bridge over the
creek. See id. While performing these repairs, the defendant sprayed shotcrete
onto the banks of the creek and dumped excess shotcrete trimmed from the
bridge into the creek. See id. Evidence presented at trial revealed that "on at least
one occasion [the defendant) sprayed tons of shotcrete into the creek while 'test-
ing' a hose." Id. An underwater inspection of the small creek revealed significant
amounts of shotcrete in the creek's bed. See id.
In United States v. Vesicol Chemical Corp., the United States District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee found a chemical corporation responsible for dis-
charging pollutants into the Mississippi River and granted summary judgment in
favor of the government. See generally 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). In
doing so, the court held that sewers leading to the river were "navigable waters"
under the CWA. See id. at 950.
53. See generally Larkins, 852 F.2d 189; East Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571. For a
discussion of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Larkins, see supra note 52. For a discus-
sion of the court's holding in East Ridge, see supra note 48.
54. East Ridge, 949 F. Supp. at 1578. Earlier cases expressed this view as well.
For example, in Riverside, the Supreme Court stated that the term navigable waters
19.98] EIDSON
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Even before Riverside, federal courts applied a broad meaning
to the term "navigable waters. '55 The United States District Court
"is of limited import." Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133. Similarly, the District Court for
the District of Montana noted that courts have interpreted "navigable waters" as
including "virtually any surface waters, navigable or not." Beartooth Alliance v.
Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (D. Mont. 1995).
55. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Riverside, the Tenth Circuit inter-
preted "navigable waters" broadly. See generally Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765
F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345 (10th
Cir. 1979). In Quivira, the Tenth Circuit held that a small gully and creek, as well
as an unnamed tributary, constituted "navigable waters." 765 F.2d at 131. For a
discussion of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Quivira, see supra note 47 and accom-
panying text.
Texas Pipe Line Co. involved a government action under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the CWA's predecessor, against a pipeline com-
pany for spilling oil into navigable waters of the United States. See 611 F.2d at 346.
The pipeline ran under a large farm and was struck accidentally by a worker oper-
ating a bulldozer. See id. Close to 600 barrels of oil spilled into an unnamed tribu-
tary of a creek that eventually led tothe Red River. See id. at 346-47. While the
company reported the incident immediately and actually earned a commendation
from the United States Coast Guard, it was still required to pay a $2,500 civil fine.
See id. at 347.
On appeal, the company argued that because the spill occurred in an un-
named tributary, the accident did not involve "navigable waters." See id. In exam-
ining the legislative intent of the FWPCA, however, the Tenth Circuit found that
the term "navigable waters" also included tributaries of navigable rivers. See id.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because the Red River was protected by legisla-
tion, the unnamed tributaries that eventually would lead to it also received protec-
tion. See id.
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Lambert ruled that marshes,
swamps, bogs and like areas were protected as "navigable waters" under the CWA.
See generally 695 F.2d 536 (11th Cir. 1983). In Lambert, the government sought a
preliminary injunction against owners of a seafood company. Id. at 538. The de-
fendants owned a large parcel of land next to the Banana River, where they rou-
tinely disposed of excess scallop shells. See id. Despite the imposition of a cease
and desist order by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the defendants
continued to dump an average of four million pounds of shells on the land each
week. See id. While the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
injunction was not the proper remedy, it adopted the Corps' extensive definition
of wetlands, stating that "'[w] etlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and
similar areas' . . . . Adjacent wetlands are those 'bordering, contiguous, or neigh-
boring' navigable waters, including '[w] etlands separated from other waters of the
United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and
the like.'" Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c)-(d) (1981)).
Taking a similarly expansive view, the Fifth Circuit handed down two decisions
in 1976 concerning "navigable waters." See generally United States v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United
States Army Corps of Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976). Both cases held that
man-made canals that connected to navigable waters were subject to legislation;
however, landlocked canals did not themselves constitute "navigable waters." See
Sexton, 526 F.2d at 1299-1300; Weiszmann, 526 F.2d at 1304-05.
Finally, several district courts produced decisions containing broad definitions
of "navigable waters" as well. See United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673-74
(M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding that non-navigable man-made mosquito canals and man-
grove wetland areas were meant to be protected as "waters of the United States");
see also United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz.
14
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for the District of Arizona held that an area is protected under the
CWA even if there is only a possibility that water could flow in and
"end up in any body of water . .. in which there is some public
interest."56 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit applied a broad definition
to "navigable waters" in Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA.57 Congressional
intent played a significant role in the Tenth Circuit's ruling that the
CWA was "intended to regulate discharges made into every creek,
stream, river or body of water that in any way may affect interstate
commerce."
58
Despite the trend to apply a broad meaning to the term "navi-
gable waters," not all courts have been willing to give broad mean-
ing to similar language in other environmental statutes.59 In James
River v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held that a river and canal that had
been drained and filled did not constitute "navigable waters" under
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act.60 Similarly, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that a "body of water must be navigable in fact . . .
[and] it must itself, or together with other waters, form a highway
over which commerce may be carried on with other states" in order
1975) (including both surface and underground water in definition of "navigable
waters"). For further discussion of these cases, see supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text.
56. Phelps, 391 F. Supp. at 1187. Furthermore, the court noted that "[f]or the
purposes of [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act] to be effectively carried into
realistic achievement, the scope of its control must extend to all pollutants which
are discharged into any waterway, including normally dry arroyos .... " Id. (empha-
sis added). See also Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that means by which area became "water of the United States" are
irrelevant).
57. 765 F.2d at 126. The Tenth Circuit held that the CWA applied to the
discharge of pollutants from uranium mining facilities into gullies and normally
dry arroyos. See id.
58. Quivira, 765 F.2d at 129 (quoting United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599
F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979)). The Tenth Circuit concluded that "it was the
clear intent of Congress to regulate waters of the United States to the fullest extent
possible under the commerce clause." Quivira, 765 F.2d at 130.
59. For a discussion of several decisions in which courts have interpreted the
language of environmental statutes broadly, see infra notes 60-64 and accompany-
ing text.
60. 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973). In James River, the plaintiffs, a nonprofit
organization and its members, sought an injunction against state and federal de-
fendants, opposing the construction of a limited access highway over a former wa-
terway. See id. at 615. In denying the desired relief, the court reasoned that the
canal had been filled and abandoned almost 100 years prior, and that it no longer
flowed in a "natural state" that could become navigable if improved. See id. at 640.
Additionally, the court indicated that the canal lacked water, the most important
element of "navigable waters." See id.
1998] EIDSON 619
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to constitute "navigable waters" under the Rivers and Harbors Ap-
propriation Act.6 1
In a notable decision involving the interpretation of the CWA,
the First Circuit concluded that ground waters were not "waters of
the United States." 62 In arriving at this conclusion, the First Circuit
looked to EPA's definition of the term.63 Because the determina-
tion of whether the term includes groundwaters involves a highly
61. Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 623 (8th Cir.
1979). In Hoffman, the Eighth Circuit examined the definition of navigable waters
under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHAA). See id. at 620.
The RHAA states, in pertinent part:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress,
to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is pro-
hibited; and it shall not be lawful to build ... any wharf, pier, dolphin,
boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port,
roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the
United States . . . and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of,
any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or inclo-
sure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any naviga-
ble water of the United States ....
RHAA § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
The district court granted a permanent injunction against the government
defendant, preventing it from asserting jurisdiction over the construction of dams
on Lake Minnetonka in Hennepin County, Minnesota. See Hoffman, 597 F.2d at
619. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that "Lake Min-
netonka is a natural [body of water and is] navigable in fact...." Id. The Eighth
Circuit noted, however, that the lake's only outlet is Minnehaha Creek, whose flow
is inadequate to allow any navigation of a private or commercial nature. See id. at
620. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that neither Lake Minnetonka nor
Minnehaha Creek constitute "navigable waters," because the waters are not "part
of a navigable interstate waterway." Id. at 623.
62. Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438,
1450-51 (1st Cir. 1992). In an effort to clean up Boston Harbor, the Corps issued a
permit to create a landfill in the town of Walpole, a suburb of Boston. See id. at
1442. The proposed landfill was to function as a disposal site for wastes generated
by water treatment facilities. See id. Citizens of Walpole and neighboring Norfolk
opposed creation of the landfill because developers planned to build over former
wetlands. See id. at 1443-44. The First Circuit rejected the citizens' argument on
appeal that groundwaters beneath the landfill were "waters of the United States."
See id. at 1450. In doing so, the First Circuit deferred to the determination of EPA
and the Corps that the ecological relationship between groundwaters and surface
waters was insufficient to make the former "waters of the United States." See id. at
1451.
63. See id. at 1450. EPA's definition of "waters of the United States" fails to
mention groundwater. See id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 (1997). As a result, the
Army Corps of Engineers has interpreted the definition as excluding groundwater.
See Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1450. But see Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422
(7th Cir. 1990); McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182,
1193-94 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (questioning whether term "waters of the United States"
should include groundwaters connected to surface waters). For a discussion of
EPA's definition of "waters of the United States," see supra note 45 and accompany-
ing text.
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ecological process, the First Circuit held that it should be left to the
discretion of EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers. 64
C. Heightened Criminal Penalties for Environmental Offenses
The CWA has always authorized government officials to im-
pose sanctions on individuals who violate its provisions. 65 In recent
years, however, Congress has added amendments to the CWA, thus
enhancing its criminal penalties. 66 Along with harsh criminal sanc-
tions, violators are prohibited from receiving certain federal bene-
fits and their names are published biannually in the Federal
Register.67 In an effort to successfully enforce these provisions,
Congress expanded the resources of EPA, and the United States
Department of Justice created a team to deal with environmental
64. See Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1451.
65. See generally CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (providing
broad authority to impose criminal sanctions). Specifically, section 102(a) of the
CWA states that "[t]he Administrator [of EPA] is authorized to make joint investi-
gations with any [federal or state] agencies of the condition of any waters in any
State or States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial wastes, or substance
which may adversely affect such waters." CWA § 102(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Fur-
thermore, the CWA provides:
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Adminis-
trator finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation
which implements [this Act] ... he shall proceed under his authority...
or he shall notify the person in alleged violation and such State of such
finding. If beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's notification
the state has not commenced appropriate enforcement action, the Ad-
ministrator shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with
such condition or limitation ....
CWA § 309(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1).
Significantly, another section of the statute states that "[n]othing... shall be
construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to...
this title." CWA § 404(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(n). For the specific text of current
criminal provisions of the CWA, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66. See Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the "Heightened Criminal Liability"
Imposed on Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 377, 381-82 (1996).
In 1987, Congress increased the possible penalties for violations of the CWA and
distinguished between negligent and intentional offenses. See id. at 382. Inten-
tional violators can now face up to three years in prison, $50,000 in fines per day of
violation, or both. See CWA § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). The amend-
ments doubled penalties for a second offense, and provided up to $250,000 in
fines and 15 years in prison for violations that "place another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily harm." See CWA § 309(c) (2) & (c)(3)(A), 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) & (c)(3)(A).
67. See Wettach, supra note 66, at 382. Businesses and individuals who are
convicted under the CWA are not entitled to receive federal contracts, funds or
loans. See id. EPA also publishes a list of violators in the Federal Register. See id.
1998]
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crimes. 68 As a result, prosecutions for environmental offenses have
increased significantly. 69
The judiciary has followed the lead of the legislative and execu-
tive branches by becoming increasingly interested in enforcing en-
vironmental laws and regulations. In considering statutes that
require a defendant to act "knowingly," a number of courts have
held that an individual does not have to knowingly violate the stat-
ute; rather, the defendant must consciously perform the acts that
constitute the violation. 70 In United States v. Weitzenhoff, the Ninth
68. See id. at 382-84. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA) to expand the resources of EPA. See NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994). Congress stated the original goals of NEPA as follows:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoya-
ble harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and bio-
sphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the under-
standing of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the
Nation ....
Id.
In 1990, Congress amended NEPA by passing the Pollution Prosecution Act of
1990. Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Star. 2963 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1994)). The new provisions authorized the Administrator of EPA to in-
crease the number of criminal investigators from 72 to 200 by 1995. See Pollution
Prosecution Act § 202(a), 33 U.S.C. § 4321. The Act also required the Administra-
tor to increase the number of civil investigators by 50 in order to assist in enforce-
ment. See id. § 203, 33 U.S.C. § 4321. Congress further stated that the
Administrator would create an institute to train "Federal, State and local lawyers,
inspectors, civil and criminal investigators, and technical experts in the enforce-
ment of the Nation's environmental laws." Id. § 204, 33 U.S.C. § 4321. Congress
appropriated $110 million to EPA between 1991 and 1995 to carry out these goals.
See id. § 205, 33 U.S.C. § 4321.
69. See Wettach, supra note 66, at 382-84. Convictions in this area increased
70% between 1989 and 1994, while fines increased 80% and jail time increased
35% during the same time period. See id. at 383.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786
F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). In United States v. Hopkins, the defendant was the vice-
president of Spirol International Corporation, which manufactured metal fasten-
ers. 53 F.3d at 534. On several occasions, the company had been confronted by
state environmental officials for discharging toxic wastewater into a nearby river.
See id. As a result, Spirol was required to monitor its wastewater and submit reports
to Connecticut's Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). See id. at 535.
Hopkins was convicted of violating the CWA after tampering with the company's
wastewater testing and falsifying reports to DEP. See id.
On appeal, Hopkins challenged his conviction because of the trial court's jury
instructions, which he claimed were erroneous. See id. at 537. While instructing
the jury on the knowledge element of the CWA, the trial judge stated that "the
government need not prove that the defendant intended to violate the law or that
the defendant had any specific knowledge of the specific requirements of the con-
ditions and limitations of the permit." Id. at 536. The Second Circuit held that the
district court's instructions were proper in light of the congressional intent behind
the CWA. See id. at 540. The Second Circuit stated that "in construing knowledge
elements that appear in . . . 'public welfare' statutes - i.e., statutes that regulate
18
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Circuit upheld a felony conviction, reasoning that the polluter need
not be aware of the CWA's provisions as long as the individual con-
sciously took part in the action that caused the violation. 7' The
the use of dangerous or injurious goods or materials - the Supreme Court has
inferred that Congress did not intend to require proof that the defendant knew his
actions were unlawful." Id. at 537 (citing United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)).
The Fourth Circuit rendered a similar holding in United States v. Dee, when it
affirmed a district court conviction of three defendants for knowingly violating the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
The defendants in Dee were civilian engineers for the United States Army and were
involved in the creation of chemical warfare systems. See id. at 743. One of the
defendants, a chemical engineer, and his three superiors were convicted of violat-
ing RCRA after illegally storing, treating and disposing of hazardous wastes. See id.
RCRA states that "[a]ny person who knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter without a RCRA permit
shall, upon conviction, be subject to fine and/or imprisonment." RCRA § 3008, 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2) (A) (1994). The defendants challenged their convictions, ar-
guing that they did not "knowingly" commit the crimes at issue. See Dee, 912 F.2d at
745. Specifically, they alleged that they were unaware that violating RCRA was a
crime or that the chemicals they handled were classified as hazardous wastes. See
id.
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by reasoning that "ignorance of the law
is no defense." Id. (quoting International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563). Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit determined that "the government did not need to prove de-
fendants knew violation of RCRA was a crime, nor that regulations existed listing
and identifying the chemical wastes as . . . hazardous wastes." Id. With respect to
the hazardous nature of the chemicals, the Fourth Circuit held that it was enough
for the government to show that the defendants knew the "general hazardous char-
acter of the wastes." Id.
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court decision acquitting a
defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict of guilty for illegal transportation of haz-
ardous wastes. See generally United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th
Cir. 1986). Hayes involved a corporation that operated an airplane refurbishing
plant in Alabama that produced several hazardous wastes. See id. at 1500. Workers
were required to drain fuel tanks in order to paint the planes and were required to
clean their paint guns using solvents. See id. In 1982, environmental officials dis-
covered illegally disposed of drums of waste from the Hayes plant. See id. at 1501.
The government charged Hayes and several of its employees under RCRA, which
requires a knowing violation of the statute. See id. Similar to Dee, the defendants
argued on appeal that they were unaware that paint waste was hazardous under
RCRA or that RCRA required permits for disposal of such waste. See id. at 1503.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument and stated that "it would be no de-
fense to claim no knowledge that the paint waste was a hazardous waste within the
meaning of the regulations; nor would it be a defense to argue ignorance of the
permit requirement." Id. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment acquitting the defendants and remanded with instructions to reinstate
the jury verdicts of guilty. See id. at 1507.
71. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994). The defendants were the manager and assis-
tant manager of a sewer treatment plant in East Honolulu, Hawaii. See id. at 1281.
The plant was located near Sandy Beach, a popular area for swimming and surfing
in Oahu. See id. The purpose of the plant was to treat four million gallons of
human wastewater each day, removing pollutants and safely discharging remains
into the ocean. See id. On forty different occasions, the defendants instructed em-
ployees to dump wastewater directly into the ocean before any treatments had
taken place. See id. at 1282. As a result, employees dumped 436,000 pounds of
1998] EIDSON 623
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Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion after a detailed examination
of the legislative history behind the statute.72
Courts also have increased the use of imprisonment and com-
munity service rather than fines when sentencing environmental of-
fenders. 73 In United States v. Hopkins, the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court order sentencing a defendant to twenty-one months
imprisonment after convicting him of violating permit restrictions,
conspiring to commit violations and tampering with a monitoring
device. 74 Similarly, defendants in United States v. Dee were each
placed on three years of probation with a condition of 1,000 hours
pollutant solids into the ocean. See id. On appeal, the defendants claimed that
they did not violate the CWA "knowingly," since they were unaware that their ac-
tions were illegal. See id. at 1283. The Ninth Circuit determined that authorizing
the illegal dumping was enough to constitute a knowing violation of the CWA. See
id. at 1284.
72. See id. at 1283-84. The Ninth Circuit considered the congressional intent
behind the 1987 amendments that increased criminal sanctions for violations of
the CWA. See id. The Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history suggests that
Congress amended the CWA in hopes of deterring potential polluters. See id.; see
also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-1004, at 138 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-50, at 29 (1985)
(evidencing Congress's intentions of deterring future pollution).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). In United
States v. Schallom, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's significant sen-
tence enhancements based solely on the lasting effects of the defendant's pollu-
tion. See Schallom, 998 F.2d at 201. Because the district court "found that a
continuing discharge would result from [the defendant's actions]," it added six
levels to the defendant's offense level at sentencing. Id. at 199. Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court order sentencing one defendant to 21
months and another to 33 months imprisonment after they discharged waste di-
rectly into ocean waters. Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1282-83; see also Nittoly, supra note
2, at 1140-42. Many courts have "gone further" than traditional fines and impris-
onment when sentencing environmental offenders. See Nittoly, supra note 2, at
1140. For example, a Wisconsin court ordered a painting company to run an-
nouncements in local newspapers admitting to environmental crimes and encour-
aging adherence to government regulations. See id. at 1141 (citing Wisconsin v.
Doyle, No. 86-CF-52 (Wisc. Cir. Ct., Juneau County, Sept. 3, 1987); Wisconsin v.
Doyle Handymark Corp., No. 86-CF-53 (Wisc. Cir. Ct., Juneau County, Sept. 3,
1987)). Similarly, a federal court in North Carolina ordered a defendant to place
an ad in the newspaper, admitting to polluting the public sewer system. See id. at
1141 (citing United States v. Central Transp., Inc., 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1362
(Mar. 5, 1990)). In another decision, a Pennsylvania court forced a publishing
corporation to pay for waste cleanup and industry education regarding environ-
mental issues. See Nittoly, supra note 2, at 1141 (citing Pennsylvania v. Suburban
Publisher, Inc., No. 780-1987 (Luzerne County Ct., Pa., Apr. 9, 1987)). Finally, in
1988 a federal judge sentenced owners of a disposal company to community ser-
vice after violating federal sanitation laws. See id. at 1141 (citing STAR LEDGER, Mar.
20, 1988, at 1). Specifically, the judge ordered the defendants to collect garbage
once a week for five years. See id.
74. 53 F.3d at 534. The Second Circuit found that the defendant frequently
falsified reports to environmental officials, ordered that unfavorable test results be
discarded and mentioned to employees his intention to avoid environmental fines.
See id. at 535.
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of community service after being convicted of unlawful storage of
hazardous materials.
75
With a trend toward harsher sentencing for environmental
crimes, many white-collar offenders are facing imprisonment rather
than traditional monetary penalties.76 For example, in Hopkins, the
Vice President of Manufacturing for an international corporation
faced a lengthy prison term after continually violating environmen-
tal laws and paying several fines. 77 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in
Dee held that federal employees working at federal facilities are also
subject to the criminal provisions of environmental statutes. 78
By prosecuting defendants under environmental laws and tan-
gentially related non-environmental statutes, the federal govern-
ment has been able to more aggressively punish environmental
offenses. 79 For example, in charging violators with established envi-
75. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dee, see supra note 70
and accompanying text.
76. See Nittoly, supra note 2, at 1125. Many businesses include potential envi-
ronmental fines in their budgets. See id. These fines are often less expensive than
the cost of proper waste disposal. See id. As a result of this practice, environmental
officials have begun to seek larger fines from corporations that violate regulations,
as well as criminal indictments against responsible corporate officers. See id.; see
also Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 534 (corporation's vice president sentenced to 21 months
in prison, two years of supervised release and $7,500 in fines after supervising and
instructing employees to perform illegal actions); United States v. Speach, 968
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (president of waste treatment corporation charged with
unlawful storage of hazardous waste when facility failed to obtain required storage
permits); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991)
(executive vice-president, safety and operations manager and technical manager of
chemical storage facility charged with violations of Solid Waste Disposal Act after
improperly storing hazardous wastes).
Corporate officers have even faced charges for the deaths or serious bodily
injuries of employees after allowing environmental crimes. See Nittoly, supra note
2, at 1126-27; see also People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (corpo-
rate officials charged with murder and corporation charged with involuntary man-
slaughter when employee died after exposure to cyanide); People v. Pymm, 563
N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990) (affirming convictions of officers of thermometer manufac-
turing corporation prosecuted for first degree assault after employee suffered
brain damage from mercury contamination).
77. See Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 535. An employee of the company testified that the
defendant often expressed concern that the business would receive another fine.
See id. Avoiding future fines was the defendant's justification for altering and falsi-
fying test results. See id.
78. See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth
Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that because they were employed by the
federal government, they were entitled to sovereign immunity. See id. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the defendants "were indicted, tried, and convicted as indi-
viduals, not as agents of the government .... [S]overeign immunity does not
attach to individual government employees so as to immunize them from prosecu-
tion for their criminal acts." Id. (citations omitted).
79. See Thomas M. Downs, Recent Developments in Environmental Crime, 17 WM.
& MARVJ. ENrTL. L. 1, 20 (1992). Criminal prosecutions for acts that affect the
6251998] EIDSON
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ronmental offenses, the government has also prosecuted actions
such as mail fraud, false statements and conspiracy in connection
with the environment. 80 For example, in United States v. Gold the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted the de-
fendants of violating the Mail Fraud Act after they made false state-
ments to EPA through the mail.81 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
upheld a conviction of aiding and abetting in relation to an envi-
ronmental crime.82 Options such as these have allowed prosecutors
to pursue environmental enforcement more aggressively. 83
environment fall into two categories. The first category consists of acts deemed
punishable by Congress in environmental statutes and the second category consists
of acts that are crimes under traditional criminal provisions. See id. at 1.
80. See id. at 20. Other offenses frequently charged in conjunction with envi-
ronmental offenses include wire fraud, aiding and abetting, and obstruction of
justice. See id. In 1990, EKOTEK, a waste disposal company, and its president were
indicted for conspiracy to violate federal environmental laws, including the CWA.
See id.; see also First U.S. Felony Environmental Prosecution in Utah Announced Against
Salt Lake City Firm, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 423 (June 29, 1990). The company ille-
gally burned and disposed of a number of hazardous materials, hiding its practice
by falsifying corporate documents. See id. The government also charged EKOTEK
with mail fraud, because it had used the mail to misrepresent to customers that the
company had complied with all environmental laws. See id. Subject to the first
federal environmental felony prosecution in Utah, EKOTEK faced $24 million in
fines, while its president faced up to 45 years in prison. See id.
81. 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979). In Gold, a chemical corporation was
the sole manufacturer of certain pesticides in the United States. Id. at 1339. These
chemicals were regulated by and registered with EPA. See id. Several corporate
executives agreed to an extensive research project that investigated the possibility
that several of the company's pesticides caused cancer in laboratory animals and
humans. See id. at 1341. The company's researchers found substantial evidence
indicating that the chemicals were causing liver cell carcinomas and tumors among
laboratory mice. See id. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) requires that all such findings be reported to EPA; however, when the
company sent its reports to EPA, it significantly understated instances of cancer.
See id. at 1339-41. The defendants were charged under the Mail Fraud Act with
conspiracy to make and having made fraudulent statements and false representa-
tions to the government through the United States mail system. See id. at 1338.
82. See generally United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989). In
Hoflin, the Director of the Public Works Department for Ocean Shores, Washing-
ton, frequently instructed employees to dispose of hazardous wastes illegally. Id. at
1035-36. In order to dispose of leftover road paint, the defendant instructed em-
ployees to bury drums of paint at a nearby sewage treatment plant. See id. at 1035.
At the time, several drums were rusted and leaking, and employees crushed the
drums when the hole they dug for burying them was not deep enough. See id.
Additionally, the defendant ordered employees to bury kitchen sludge, rather than
treat it properly. See id. at 1036. Both of these actions violated federal environ-
mental permitting regulations. See id. A federal district court convicted the de-
fendant for aiding and abetting the disposal of hazardous waste and burial of
sludge, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. See id. at 1040.
83. See Downs, supra note 79, at 20. Prosecutors have become more aggres-
sive, and quite creative, in order to impose harsher penalties for environmental
violations. See id. at 19-20. The government now prosecutes environmental offend-
ers under general criminal provisions, such as mail fraud and conspiracy, and
22
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As in all criminal cases, courts must also consider the rights of
defendants charged with environmental violations.8 4 For this rea-
son, many courts have applied the rule of lenity, which requires
courts to construe statutory ambiguity in favor of the defendant.8 5
For example, the First Circuit recently applied the rule of lenity in
deciding whether the CWA covered employers who knowingly sub-
jected employees to hazardous substances.8 6 Since the statute was
unclear, the First Circuit held that the CWA's purpose was regula-
under "obscure," nontraditional statutes. See id. For example, federal prosecutors
included charges under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) when they dealt
with the Exxon Valdez spill. See id. at 19. The MBTA prohibits "the killing of
migratory birds without required permits." Id. (citing MBTA § 6, 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a) (1994)).
84. See Thomas E. Daniels, Gideon's Hollow Promise-How Appointed Counsel Are
Prevented from Fulfilling Their Role in the Criminal Justice System, 71 MIcH. Bus. L.J.
136, 140 (1992) (noting that courts have "responsibility for ensuring defendants'
constitutional rights").
85. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990); United States v.
Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). Where a statute's language and
legislative history are ambiguous, the Supreme Court has held that the rule of
lenity must be applied by courts. See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158 (holding that when
governing standard is set forth in criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply rule of
lenity in resolving any ambiguity in scope of statute's coverage). In Plaza Health,
the defendant was co-owner and vice-president of a blood-testing laboratory. 3
F.3d at 643. On more than one occasion, the defendant transported numerous
vials of blood to his residence, removed the vials from his car and placed them on
the edge of the Hudson River during low tide. See id. at 644. A few months later, a
class of eighth graders discovered the vials while on a field trip in Staten Island. See
id. Some vials had washed up on shore, but several were floating in the water. See
id. They all contained human blood and some were cracked. See id. City workers
eventually recovered seventy vials of blood from the water. See id.
Shortly after this incident, a maintenance worker at the defendant's condo-
minium complex found a plastic container holding blood vials on the condomin-
ium's grounds. See id. Authorities discovered a large number of vials later that
day. See id. Testing revealed that the blood in ten of these vials was contaminated
with the hepatitis-B virus. See id. Officials traced the vials to the defendant's labo-
ratory and subsequently, the defendant was convicted of several violations of the
CWA. See id.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the government failed to prove that the
pollutants were discharged from a "point source." See id. His main contention was
that the CWA's definition of "point source" did not include discharges from
human beings. See id. The Second Circuit determined that the CWA and its legis-
lative history were ambiguous as to whether human beings were considered "point
sources." See id. at 647-49. Therefore, the Second Circuit decided that the rule of
lenity required the issue to be resolved in the defendant's favor. See id. at 649.
86. See generally United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992). In
United States v. Borowski, the defendant was the owner and president of a company
that manufactured optical mirrors. Id. at 28. The company used several rinses,
dips and baths to plate mirrors with nickel. See id. Employees frequently used
nitric acid to strip nickel from mirrors that had been plated improperly. See id.
When disposing of nickel and nitric acid baths after use, employees simply
dumped the liquids into sinks. See id. As a result, the substances drained into
underground pipes and eventually emptied into the city's sewer system, violating
EPA regulations. See id.
1998]
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tory in nature and did not prohibit employers from exposing em-
ployees to hazardous waste in the scope of their employment.8 7
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The question before the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Eid-
son was "whether the drainage ditch into which [the defendants']
company discharged industrial wastewater was a 'navigable water'
within the meaning of [the CWA]."88 The Eleventh Circuit began
its analysis by examining the defendants' argument that the govern-
ment failed to prove that the drainage ditch in question was a "navi-
gable water" under the CWA.8 9 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit
first turned to the plain language of the CWA.90
The CWA merely defines navigable waters as "waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas." 9' Due to this ambigu-
ous language, the Eleventh Circuit turned to the CWA's legislative
history for guidance. 92 After a careful examination of the history,
As a result of this practice, employees of the defendant were exposed to large
quantities of hazardous chemicals and fumes. See id. Evidence at trial showed that
safety gear proved insufficient and ventilation was poor. See id. Medical experts
testified that enormous health concerns such as skin disorders, breathing
problems and nasal bleeding could result from such exposure. See id. Moreover,
both the corporation and its president knew the practices put employees at risk.
See id. at 29.
The corporation and its owner were convicted under "knowing endanger-
ment" provisions of the CWA. See id. at 29. On appeal, the First Circuit applied
the rule of lenity and found that the statute was ambiguous as to whether employ-
ees were protected by the CWA. See id. at 31-32. The First Circuit also noted that
"the fact that this case involve [d] pollution [did] not make the rule of lenity inap-
plicable." Id. at 32 n.9.
87. See id. at 32. The First Circuit noted that the defendant's conduct was
"utterly reprehensible and may have violated any number of other criminal laws."
Id. The First Circuit held, however, that the CWA could not provide employees
with a remedy because they were endangered in the course of their work, prior to
any illegal discharge affecting public facilities. See id.
88. 108 F.3d 1336, 1339 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 248 (1997). The
defendants also challenged their sentences and their mail fraud convictions, alleg-
ing that the convictions were not supported by evidence. See id. at 1343. The Elev-
enth Circuit rejected their claim regarding the mail fraud convictions, however,
concluding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants had
made false representations to customers through the United States Postal Service.
See id. In dealing with the defendants' challenges to the upward sentencing adjust-
ments of the district court, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentences and re-
manded to the lower court for re-sentencing. See id.
89. See id. at 1340-43. The Eleventh Circuit considered the claim de novo,
reviewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See id. at 1341.
90. See id. For a discussion of the language and history of the CWA, see supra
notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
91. CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
92. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341. For a discussion of the CWA's legislative his-
tory, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Congress intended the provi-
sions of the CWA to have a broad scope. 93 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that Congress enacted the CWA to regulate con-
tamination of all waters that could eventually reach waters affecting
interstate commerce. 94 Not only did it consider congressional in-
tent, but the Eleventh Circuit also examined EPA's definition of
"waters of the United States. '95 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
EPA's specific list of areas that constituted "waters of the United
States" was in accordance with the legislative history and purpose of
the CWA.96
The Eleventh Circuit also examined other courts' interpreta-
tions of the term "navigable waters," under the CWA and several
other environmental statutes.97 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out
that most courts favored a broad interpretation of the CWA.98 It
further noted that many courts recognized unnamed tributaries as
"navigable waters" when the tributaries lead to bodies of water in-
volved in interstate commerce. 99
93. See id. The Eleventh Circuit relied on prior interpretations of the congres-
sional intent behind the statute. See id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 538
(lth Cir. 1983)). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the ambiguous definition
of navigable waters "'makes it clear that the term 'navigable' as used in the Act is of
limited import' and that ... Congress chose to regulate waters that would not be
deemed navigable under the classical understanding of that term." Id. (quoting
Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133).
94. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh
Circuit considered Congress's statement that "water moves in hydrologic cycles
and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source." Id. at
1341 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
374243). Thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Congress intended the
CWA to protect "navigable waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries." Id.
95. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341. For EPA's definition of "waters of the United
States," see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
96. See id. For EPA's definition of "waters of the United States," see supra
notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
97. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 134142. For a discussion of interpretations of "nav-
igable waters of the United States," see supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
98. See id. at 1341. The Eleventh Circuit quoted one of its past cases, stating
that Congress intended the definition of navigable waters "'to reach to the full
extent permissible under the Constitution."' Id. (quoting Lambert, 695 F.2d at
538). The Eleventh Circuit also relied heavily on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Riverside when it agreed with the Court's reasoning that Con-
gress intended the CWA to protect waters that were not "navigable" under the
traditional definition of the word. See id. (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133).
99. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342. The Eleventh Circuit took notice of a
number of cases involving tributaries. See id. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit rec-
ognized that in Texas Pipe Line, the Tenth Circuit held that an unnamed tributary
with a minimal flow was a "navigable water" for purposes of the CWA. See id. (cit-
ing United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979)). The
Eleventh Circuit also referred to Ashland Oil, where the Sixth Circuit held that a
1998] EIDSON 629
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Next, the Eleventh Circuit considered cases involving man-
made bodies of water. 100 These cases held that the term "navigable
waters" was not limited to natural bodies of water. 10 1 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with these courts, stating that "pollutants are equally
harmful to this country's water quality whether they travel along
man-made or natural routes."10 2
The Eleventh Circuit also found support among cases involving
tributaries with intermittent flows.' 0 3 These decisions established
that pollutants need not reach waters "immediately or continu-
ously" to cause significant damage. 10 4 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed that a tributary with little or no flow was a "navigable water,"
tributary flowing into a navigable river was "navigable water." See id. (citing United
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 1317, 1324 (6th Cir. 1974)).
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the court's holding in Georgia v. City of East
Ridge, in which the court extended this definition further by ruling that an un-
named tributary of an interstate creek constituted "navigable waters." See id. (cit-
ing Georgia v. City of East Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1996)). For a
further discussion of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Texas Pipe Line, see supra note
55. For an analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ashland Oil, see supra note 47.
For a detailed discussion of the court's holding in East Ridge, see supra note 48.
100. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342 (citing Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896
F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp.
947 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla.
1974).
101. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342. The Eleventh Circuit relied on language
from a federal district court in Florida, stating "the fact that bodies of water are
,man-made makes no difference .... That the defendants used them to convey
pollutants without a permit is the matter of importance."' Id. (quoting Holland,
373 F. Supp. at 673). In Holland, the waters at issue were man-made mosquito
canals that eventually emptied into Tampa Bay. See Holland, 373 F. Supp. at 673.
For a further discussion of Holland, see supra note 48.
102. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342.
103. See id. (citing Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir.
1985); Texas Pipe Line, 611 F.2d at 130; United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975)). The Eleventh Circuit determined that,
although flow is only intermittent, pollution of such a body of water "is capable of
spreading environmental damage and is thus a 'water of the United States under
the Act.'" Id. (citing Texas Pipe Line, 611 F.2d at 347).
104. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342. Here, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Texas Pipe Line Co. that, for purposes of determining
whether water is covered by the CWA, it is not important if a tributary was flowing
into a navigable body of water at the time of the polluted discharge. Id. (quoting
Texas Pipe Line, 611 F.2d at 347). The Eleventh Circuit also found support for its
decision in Quivira, where the Tenth Circuit upheld the regulation of a tributary
which occasionally connected to navigable streams during times of intense rainfall.
See id. (citing Quivira, 765 F.2d at 130). Finally, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with a
district court's holding that normally dry arroyos, from which water may possibly
flow to navigable waters, are covered under the CWA. See id. at 1342 (citing Phelps
Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1187).
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EIDSON
when the possibility existed that the tributary may discharge materi-
als into a navigable body of water.105
Having examined the legislative history of the CWA, EPA's reg-
ulations and the reasoning of other courts, the Eleventh Circuit
then considered the facts in Eidson.10 6 In Eidson, the storm sewer,
drainage ditch and drainage canal "were all part of a... system that
was designed to discharge storm water into Tampa Bay."'107 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that this was sufficient evidence to hold
that the drainage ditch was a tributary of Tampa Bay and, therefore,
a "navigable water" under the CWA.108 The Eleventh Circuit rea-
soned that "[lt] o hold otherwise and to allow polluters to contami-
nate this drainage system would defeat the intent of Congress and
would jeopardize the health of our nation's waters."'10 9
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the CWA was consis-
tent with the statute's legislative intent, as well as prior case law.' 10
In giving a broad meaning to the term "navigable waters," the Elev-
enth Circuit followed the current trend toward strict enforcement
of environmental laws through criminal penalties.' l The holding
of the Eleventh Circuit in Eidson, however, may seem inconsistent
with several rules of statutory interpretation. 112
A. The Legislative Intent and Purpose Behind the CWA
When Congress was considering passage of the CWA, environ-
mental concerns were gaining recognition in the United States and
105. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342.
106. See id. at 134243. For a discussion of the facts in Eidson, see supra notes
15-32 and accompanying text.
107. See id. at 1342. On the date in question, the storm sewer into which
Cherokee employees were discharging waste was flowing lightly into an open
drainage ditch connecting Ingraham and Commerce Streets in Tampa. See id. at
1342-43. The flow continued northward into an underground drainage canal that
discharged into Tampa Bay. See id. This pattern was normal during times of signif-
icant rainfall and high tides. See id.
108. See id. at 1343.
109. Id.
110. For a discussion of the legislative intent of the CWA, see supra notes 33-
43 and accompanying text. For an analysis of prior case law, see supra notes 47-64
and accompanying text.
111. For an examination of the trend toward strict enforcement of environ-
mental laws, see supra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.




Riley: United States v. Eidson: Navigating the Way toward Stiffer Penalt
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
632 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 605
the rest of the world.1 13 Legislators had become increasingly aware
of the adverse effects of pollution on public health and were seek-
ing to improve conditions through strict enforcement of environ-
mental guidelines. 114 In the text of the CWA, Congress stated that
its goal was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."1 15 The CWA, however,
merely defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." 116 Faced with this ambiguous lan-
guage, the Eleventh Circuit correctly turned to the history behind
the CWA.1 17
113. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 3-4 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3670-74. In its report, the Senate noted that members "became increasingly con-
cerned during 1970 with the effects of pollution upon public health." Id. It fur-
ther stated that the problem of pollution was "more severe, more pervasive, and
growing at a more rapid rate than was generally believed." Id.
This concern continued even after Congress enacted the CWA, leading to its
strict enforcement by officials. See Nittoly, supra note 2, at 1125. Publicity sur-
rounding environmental issues increased during the 1980's. See id. As a result,
authorities began pursuing harsh criminal penalties for violations, including signif-
icant fines and prison sentences. See id. Officials believed this was the only way to
deter dangerous disposal of pollutants. See id.
114. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 3-4 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3670-74. After a two-year study of water pollution in the United States, the Senate's
Public Works Committee found that efforts to protect the environment were prov-
ing inadequate. See id. The Committee's findings revealed the following:
-Many of the Nation's navigable waters [were] severely polluted, and
major waterways near the industrial and urban areas [were] unfit for
most purposes;
-Rivers [were] the primary sources of pollution of coastal waters and the
oceans, and many lakes and confined waterways [were] aging rapidly
under the impact of increased pollution;
-Rivers, lakes, and streams [were] being used to dispose of ... wastes
rather than to support ... life and health; and
-The use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste treatment system
[was] unacceptable.
Id. Congress noted that the objective of the CWA could only be met through "vig-
orous and adequate pollution control programs." Id. It criticized the "almost total
lack of enforcement" of environmental guidelines prior to enactment of the CWA.
Id.
Congress continued to advocate vigorous enforcement when it amended the
CWA in 1985. See S. REP. No. 99-50, at 29-30 (1985). In its report, the Senate
stated that stronger criminal sanctions were necessary to deter unlawful conduct
under the CWA. See id. at 29. Because of serious risks to public health and safety,
Congress noted that violations of water-related pollution needed to be "discour-
aged as strongly as possible and should be subject[ed] to extraordinary sanctions
when they occur[red]." Id. at 30. The Senate found strong public support for
aggressive enforcement of environmental regulations and believed that imposing
harsher criminal sanctions would reflect the public's sentiments effectively. See id.
115. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
116. Id. § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
117. SeeEidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42.
28
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss2/7
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the CWA's broad defini-
tion of "navigable waters" was evidence that the term was "of limited
import," and that Congress intended to regulate many types of "wa-
ters" and not only those that were "navigable" in the traditional
sense of the term.118 In making its decision, the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed a Senate Report, which provided that "reference to the
control requirements [of the CWA] must be made to the navigable
waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries."' 19 Based on this in-
formation from the legislative history, the Eleventh Circuit held
that "Congress intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
all waters that may eventually lead to waters affecting interstate
commerce."' 20 Because it extended the term "navigable waters" to
the sewer system and drainage ditch at issue in Eidson, the Eleventh
Circuit followed Congress's goal of deterring water pollution
through strict enforcement and harsh criminal penalties.' 21
B. Judicial Consistency in Applying the CWA
The Eleventh Circuit's decision was consistent with precedent
when it held that a storm sewer and drainage ditch were "waters of
the United States," as used in the CWA. In Eidson, the Eleventh
Circuit relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court in Riv-
erside.122 In Riverside, the Court ruled that Congress intended the
term "navigable" to be construed broadly, encompassing more than
waters that merely were navigable in fact.123
Similarly, prior case law confirms that "Congress intended the
definition of navigable waters under the Act 'to reach to the full
extent permissible under the Constitution.' "' 124 Thus, courts have
held that tributaries to navigable bodies of water, whether natural
or man-made, constitute "waters of the United States."' 25 Addition-
118. Id. at 1341 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 133 (1985)).
119. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742-43).
120. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341.
121. For a discussion of Congress's goal of deterring water pollution, see
supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
122. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42 (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. 121). For a dis-
cussion of the facts in Riverside, see supra notes 48-51.
123. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42 (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133).
124. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341 (quoting United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536,
538 (11th Cir. 1983)).
125. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating it is irrelevant how property in question became "water of the United
States"); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tenn.
1976) (holding that sewers leading to Mississippi River were "navigable waters"); see
1998] EIDSON
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ally, courts have noted that "waters of the United States" can in-
clude tributaries that do not have a constant flow. 126
There is overwhelming agreement among courts that in order
"to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation's waters ... Congress chose to define the wa-
ters covered by the [CWA] broadly."127 If the Eleventh Circuit had
held otherwise, it would have ignored precedent, allowing polluters
to continue contamination, thereby "defeat[ing] the intent of Con-
gress and . . . jeopardiz[ing] the health of our nation's waters." 128
C. Canons of Statutory Construction
Faced with an ambiguous statute, the Eleventh Circuit cor-
rectly looked to the CWA's legislative history for guidance.1 29 The
debates and reports of Congress suggest that the legislature in-
also United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976) (rul-
ing that man-made canals connecting to navigable waters were protected under
CWA); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same).
The Eleventh Circuit in Eidson referred to a number of cases where courts
held natural tributaries to be "navigable" under the CWA. See id. (citing United
States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979))(holding that
tributary of navigable river was protected by CWA); United States v. Ashland Oil &
Transp. Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 1317, 1324 (6th Cir. 1974) (ruling that tributary was
"navigable water"); Georgia v. City of East Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571, 1578 (N.D.
Ga. 1996) (holding that unnamed tributary of interstate creek constituted "naviga-
ble water")). For a discussion of the facts of these cases, see supra notes 47-48 & 55.
In addition, courts have held that "[piollutants are equally harmful to this
country's water quality whether they travel along man-made or natural routes. The
fact that bodies of water are 'man-made' makes no difference .... That the de-
fendants used them to convey the pollutants without a permit is the matter of
importance." Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342 (quoting United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974)). For a discussion of Holland, see supra note 48.
126. See Texas Pipe Line, 611 F.2d at 347 (holding it is irrelevant whether
stream was discharging water into river at time of violation); see also Quivira Mining
Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (approving regulation where tribu-
tary connected to navigable stream only during times of intense rainfall); Ashland
Oi4 504 F.2d at 1329 (holding prosecutors need not prove that pollutant actually
reached navigable body of water).
127. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341 (quoting CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994);
Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131).
128. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1343 (justifying holding that storm drainage system
was "water of the United States" under CWA).
129. See New Jersey v. New York, No. 120, 1997 WL 291594, at *24 (U.S. Mar.
31, 1997) (stating that Court has "repeatedly looked to legislative history and other
extrinsic material when required to interpret a statute which is ambiguous");
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 271 (1990) (holding that ambiguous
.statute must be interpreted by reference to its general purpose, as revealed by its
overall structure and by the legislative history"); Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d
1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that when plain language of statute is not clear,
it is appropriate to rely on legislative history); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949,
951 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that "cardinal canon of statutory construction [is] that
30
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tended the term "navigable waters" to encompass a wide variety of
waterways.1 30 It is not clear, however, that storm drainage systems
were included in this definition.' 3 '
1. The Rule of Lenity
When determining the meaning of a criminal statute, the
Supreme Court has held that courts must "apply the rule of lenity
in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage." 13 2
This standard guarantees fair warning of the consequences of crimi-
nal acts and guarantees that the legislature, rather than the judici-
ary, defines criminal conduct. 133 Therefore, when the policies and
goals behind a statute are unclear and the legislative history is un-
certain, courts are obligated to interpret ambiguous language in
favor of the defendant.1 3 4
There is no question that the language of the CWA is ambigu-
ous in defining "navigable waters.' 35 Most courts, including the
Eleventh Circuit, have turned to the legislative history of the CWA
for guidance.1 36 The legislative history has provided many courts
with valuable information regarding the goals and concerns of Con-
gress;' 37 however, the Supreme Court has noted that neither the
legislative history nor the underlying policies behind the CWA "pro-
statutes should be interpreted harmoniously with their dominant legislative his-
tory") (quoting United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1096 (6th Cir. 1989)).
130. For a discussion of the legislative intent of the CWA, see supra notes 33-
43 and accompanying text.
131. For an examination of the reasons that courts should not interpret the
CWA such that it regulates drainage systems, see infra notes 132-49 and accompa-
nying text.
132. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). For a discussion of
cases applying the rule of lenity to environmental statutes, see supra notes 84-87
and accompanying text.
133. See id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971)).
134. See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158 (citing K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 291 (1988)); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
135. See, e.g., Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42; see also United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-34 (1985) (noting that Congress's broad
definition of "navigable waters" is ambiguous and unclear).
136. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42; see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-34; Geor-
gia v. City of East Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (relying on
legislative history in order to construe CWA broadly); United States v. Phelps
Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that, based on
legislative intent, dry arroyos that occasionally fill with water are "navigable
waters").
137. For a discussion of courts' interpretations of the CWA, see supra notes
47-64 and accompanying text.
1998] EIDSON 635
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vides unambiguous guidance."'1 38 As a result, several courts have
applied the rule of lenity to the language of the CWA.13 9
It remains uncertain why Congress has failed to clarify this is-
sue with specific statutory language, or why it used the term "naviga-
ble waters" in the first place. Therefore, while the Eleventh Circuit
took several adequate and well-settled steps in interpreting the
CWA, there is a strong argument that it would be equitable for the
courts to apply the rule of lenity in this case.
2. Inclusio Unius
It is well-established that Congress abandoned any require-
ment of navigability-in-fact when it defined navigable waters as "wa-
ters of the United States." 140 Following this broad definition, EPA
issued a federal regulation defining the scope of the term with
more clarity than Congress. 141 This regulation contains an exten-
sive list of areas covered by the CWA, including "rivers, streams...
mudflats . . . prairie potholes [and] . . . wet meadows."' 4 2 Sewer
and storm drainage systems, however, are noticeably absent from
EPA's definition of "waters of the United States." 143 One commen-
tator noted that the regulation fails to "indicate whether this list is
138. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 F.3d 649 (2d Cir.
1993); United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992). In Plaza Health, the
Second Circuit considered whether the term "point source" included human be-
ings under the CWA. 3 F.3d at 649. Since the Second Circuit was unable to dis-
cern the "obvious intention of the legislature," it stated that it must resolve the
question in favor of the defendant. Id. The Second Circuit further stated that
ambiguity must always be construed in favor of the defendants "unless and until
Congress plainly states that [courts] have misconstrued its intent." Id. (quoting
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990)).
Similarly, the First Circuit applied the rule of lenity in United States v. Borowski.
977 F.2d 27, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1992). There, the First Circuit used the rule of lenity to
determine that the CWA did not afford protection to industrial employees who
handled pollutants while at work. See id. The First Circuit also noted that the rule
of lenity was applicable in cases involving pollution. See id. at n.9.
140. See generally Philip M. Quatrochi, Comment, Groundwater Jurisdiction
Under the Clean Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, 23 B.C. ENvrL. Are. L.
REv. 603 (1996); see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (stating Congress intended to
abolish limits on navigability set in earlier legislation); United States v. Larkins, 852
F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding wetlands constitute "navigable waters"); East
Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571 (applying CWA to unnamed tributary).
141. For the language of EPA's definition of "waters of the United States," see
supra note 45.
142. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 (1997).
143. See id.
32
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exclusive or, alternatively, whether this list cites only some types of
waters that will be considered 'waters of the United States."1
44
Inclusio unius is a well-known rule of statutory interpreta-
tion.' 4 5 According to the rule, when the legislature includes a
number of items in a statute's language, the exclusion of certain
objects implies that the omission was intentional.1 4 6 In this case,
for example, EPA's failure to specify sewer and storm drainage sys-
tems in its definition of "waters of the United States" suggests that
EPA intended to exclude sewer and storm drainage systems from
the scope of the CWA. The purpose of the inclusio unius rule "is to
emphasize that statutes should not be casually construed to man-
date changes not specified by the language chosen.' 4 7 The Elev-
enth Circuit and other courts, however, have failed to follow this
rule in construing the CWA.
In failing to apply these important concepts of statutory con-
struction, the Eleventh Circuit and many other courts have inter-
preted the CWA broadly. 148 At the same time, however, this seems
to be the appropriate interpretation. 149 Had the Eleventh Circuit
not found the storm drainage system in Eidson to be a "navigable
water," the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters" would be in great danger.
VI. IMPACT
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Eidson will
have a potentially significant effect in the area of environmental
crime. At a time when environmental issues are receiving increased
144. Quatrochi, supra note 140, at 615. In his Comment, Quatrochi ex-
amined the issue of whether groundwater is protected as a "water of the United
States." See id. at 603. He noted that, while groundwater is essential to the water
systems of this country, a majority of courts have been hesitant to include it in the
CWA's definition of "navigable waters." See id. at 643.
145. See generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992). In its entirety, the rule is "inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of another) . Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. Courts often do not mention inclusio unius because "it is so much
a part of the interpretive process that.., the correctness of the interpretation will
not be questioned." Id. at 921.
148. See generally Robin L. Greenwald, What's the "Point" of the Clean Water Act
Following United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.?: The Second Circuit Acts as
a Legislator Rather Than as a Court, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 689 (1994). At least one
commentator has argued that the Second Circuit's decision in Plaza Health was not
supported by the language of the CWA. See id. at 723-24. As a result, this critic
asserted that the Second Circuit "essentially rewr[ote] the Clean Water Act to limit
its coverage to a very small subset of water pollution." Id.
149. See id. at 689 (criticizing courts' narrow interpretations of the CWA).
1998] EIDSON
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attention, federal and state prosecutors are aggressively pursuing
environmental criminals. 150 By broadening the definition of "navi-
gable waters," the Eleventh Circuit has promoted the imposition of
criminal penalties on even more environmental offenders. 151
As a result of cases such as Eidson, corporate officers may begin
taking environmental regulations more seriously. 152 Offenders now
face serious prison sentences, rather than mere monetary penalties,
for instructing or allowing employees to violate environmental
laws.1 53 Another effect may be the end of the common practice of
many businesses that anticipate environmental fines by including
them in their budgets. 154
Potential defendants are not the only individuals who will be
affected by this decision. Attorneys who have previously repre-
sented businesses and individuals in purely civil matters may be de-
fending the same clients in future criminal cases.1 55 Thus, lawyers
with experience in civil law will have to become familiar with the
criminal justice system. 156 Criminal defense attorneys also will need
to become well-versed in environmental statutes and regulations. 157
Without this knowledge, attorneys and defendants will remain
"weaponless in the government's continuing fight against environ-
mental pollution."158
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Eidson has affected at
least three aspects of environmental law. First, prosecutors will en-
joy more flexibility in enforcing environmental regulations. Sec-
ond, corporate officers, as well as small business owners, may begin
to comply more faithfully with environmental laws. Third, attor-
neys will be required to broaden their expertise.
Kerni Ann Riley
150. For a detailed description of the current trend toward strict environmen-
tal enforcement, see supra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
151. See Wettach, supra note 66, at 382 (analyzing heightened criminal en-
forcement of environmental regulations); see also Larson & Overton, supra note 1,
at 132 (discussing increase in environmental prosecutions due to broad readings
of statutes and regulations).
152. For a discussion of the CWA's effect on corporate officials, see supra
notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
153. For the sentencing provisions of the CWA, see supra note 35 and accom-
panying text.
154. For a discussion of recent sentencing developments, see supra notes 73-
83 and accompanying text.
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